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Scenario three: political solution

机译：方案三：政治解决

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Given successive governments' historic antipathy to a federal state solution, as demanded by many armed ethnic minority groups, a political solution remains highly unlikely. Such a solution would only come to pass under two scenarios, with the first being a significant change of power relations at the centre, with more moderate actors assuming power who would be more amenable towards addressing armed ethnic minority groups' demands. The second would be if significant concessions by ethnic minorities towards a more unitary state structure altered the balance of power. While both these outcomes would enhance stability in the border regions by removing the rationale for conflict, both are unlikely. The elections of November 2010, far from indicating a willingness by the regime to negotiate, appear to reflect its determination to remain in control and therefore suggest that political concessions to the ethnic groups will not be forthcoming. Over the long term, internal factors could lead the central government to become more open to dialogue. This would particularly be the case if rifts began to open up between key government figures. A senior leader of several political ethnic minority alliances told Jane's that such an outcome was possible since anti-insurgency operations were mainly commanded by Than Shwe and close allies, but are opposed to varying degrees by most others. The source also told Janes that an increasing number of incidents suggest "a very unstable military". Examples include reports of elements within light infantry divisions (LID) 55, 66 and 77 objecting to orders to attack armed ethnic groups in 2010.
机译：鉴于历届政府对许多武装少数族裔群体的要求都对联邦政府的解决方案怀有历史性的不满，因此政治解决方案仍然极不可能。这样的解决方案只有在两种情况下才能通过，第一种是中央权力关系的重大变化，更多温和的行为者将接任权力，他们更愿意解决武装少数群体的需求。第二个问题是，如果少数族裔对国家结构更加统一的重大让步改变了均势。虽然这两种结果都将通过消除冲突的理由来增强边境地区的稳定，但两者均不太可能。 2010年11月的选举并没有表明该政权愿意进行谈判，而是在反映其决心继续控制自己的决心，因此表明对民族的政治让步将不会实现。从长远来看，内部因素可能导致中央政府对对话更加开放。如果政府关键人物之间开始出现裂痕，情况将尤其如此。几个政治少数族裔联盟的高级领导人告诉简（Jane），由于反叛乱行动主要由丹瑞和亲密盟友指挥，但大多数人不同程度地反对，所以这种结果是可能的。消息人士还告诉简斯，事件的增加表明“军队非常不稳定”。例如，关于轻步兵师（LID）55、66和77中的分子反对在2010年袭击武装民族的命令的报道。

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    《Jane's intelligence review》 |2011年第6期|p.34|共1页
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