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Corporate social responsibility and the choice of price versus quantities

机译:企业社会责任以及价格与数量的选择

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摘要

This paper revisits the classic issue of comparison between price and quantity competition in the presence of Corporate Social Responsible (CSR) private firms. The results regarding CSR firms are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom regarding profit-seeking firms. In fact, profits can be larger under Cournot (resp. Bertrand) competition also when products are complements (resp. substitutes). Moreover, if the goods are substitutes, then the dominant strategy for each firm may be the choice of the price contract in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Also, the dominant Bertrand strategy equilibrium when the goods are complements may be Pareto-inferior from the firms’ perspective. Finally, the cornerstone belief that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition may also be reversed.
机译:本文回顾了在存在企业社会责任(CSR)私营企业的情况下,价格与数量竞争之间比较的经典问题。有关企业社会责任公司的结果与有关寻求利润的公司的传统观点形成鲜明对比。实际上,当产品是补品(替代品)时,在古诺(替代伯特朗)的竞争下,利润也会更大。此外,如果商品是替代品,那么每个公司的主导策略可能是子博弈完美纳什均衡中价格合同的选择。此外,从企业的角度来看,当商品为互补品时,占主导地位的贝特朗德战略均衡可能是帕累托劣等的。最终,人们也可能颠倒了人们对Bertrand竞争比Cournot竞争更有效率这一基石的信念。

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