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Safeguards and voluntary export restraints under the World Trade Organization: The case of Japan's vegetable trade

机译:世界贸易组织(WTO)的保障措施和自愿出口限制:以日本的蔬菜贸易为例

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Though the WTO agreement of safeguards prohibits VERs, WTO members can still use VERs without formal intergovernmental agreements. Our theoretical analysis shows that the fear of invoking a safeguard measure by an importing country on a good can induce a disruptive exporter of the good to enforce such a VER under certain conditions (for example, if the number of exporting country is not large). Our empirical analysis, using Japan's first safeguard actions as a case study, suggests that if producers of an exporting country capture an export market and if there is a large drop in their export price, the producers seeing a growing threat of safeguards will enforce such VERs. Our results highlight the need for amendments to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
机译:尽管WTO的保障措施协定禁止使用VER,但WTO成员仍可在没有正式的政府间协议的情况下使用VER。我们的理论分析表明,担心进口国对商品采取保障措施会导致破坏性的商品出口商在一定条件下(例如,如果出口国数量不多)实施这种VER。我们的经验分析以日本的第一个保障措施为例,表明如果出口国的生产商占领出口市场,并且其出口价格大幅下跌,则生产商将看到越来越多的保障措施威胁将强制执行此类自愿减排协议。 。我们的结果表明,有必要对《 WTO保障协定》进行修正。

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