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Legal Regimes and Investor Response to the Auditor's Going-Concern Opinion

机译:法律制度和投资者对审计师持续经营意见的回应

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This article examines how legal regime may affect the market's reaction to the auditor's going-concern (GC) opinion. We hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, investors in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime (the United Kingdom) will react more adversely to a first-time GC opinion indicating increased risk of loss associated with bankruptcy than do investors in a debtor-friendly bankruptcy regime (the United States). Our empirical results are consistent with this expectation. These findings are strengthened by additional analysis of the impact of the recent convergence in bankruptcy regime between the United States and United Kingdom on the market reaction to GC opinions in the United States. Our findings demonstrate a specific situation where the auditing standards and institutional factors interact, with their joint impact affecting the market's reaction to the GC opinion.
机译:本文探讨了法律制度如何影响市场对审计师持续经营意见的反应。我们假设,在其他情况下,采用债权人友好型破产制度的投资者(英国)将对首次GC意见做出不利的反应,该意见表明与破产人友好的破产制度相比,与破产相关的损失风险增加了(美国)。我们的实证结果与此预期相符。通过进一步分析美国和英国之间最近破产制度的趋同对美国市场对GC意见的市场反应的影响,进一步加强了这些发现。我们的发现表明,审计准则和制度因素相互影响,共同影响市场对GC意见的反应,这是一种特殊情况。

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