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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting, auditing & finance >Implications of Political Patronage and Political Costs for Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From the Shanghai Pension Corruption Scandal
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Implications of Political Patronage and Political Costs for Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From the Shanghai Pension Corruption Scandal

机译：政治赞助和政治成本对公司披露的影响：来自上海养老金腐败丑闻的证据

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摘要

We take advantage of China's relationship-based institutional setting to investigate whether and how firms' disclosure decision is affected by political patronage and associated political costs considerations. Using a sample of 65 firms involved in the Shanghai Pension corruption scandal of 2006, we find that relative to benchmark firms, the connected firms are associated with lower levels of disclosure prior to the scandal. However, they significantly increased their disclosures in the year immediately following the public exposure of the scandal. A content analysis indicates that the increased disclosures are value-relevant, and are not merely used as a public relations effort to subdue public outcry in the immediate aftermath of the scandal. Cross-sectional analyses further reveal that the increase in disclosure is positively associated with the extent of firm's guanxi dependence and type/severity of involvement in the scandal. We conclude that the increased disclosures are in response to the heightened risk and potential costs of regulatory and public scrutiny in the wake of a major event involving high political and public sensitivity. The evidence is supportive of the political costs hypothesis, and has important managerial and policy implications.
机译：我们利用中国基于关系的制度设置来调查公司的披露决定是否以及如何受到政治赞助和相关政治成本因素的影响。通过对2006年参与上海养老金腐败丑闻的65家公司进行抽样调查，我们发现与基准公司相比，关联公司在丑闻发生之前的披露水平较低。但是，在丑闻公开曝光后的第一年，他们大幅增加了披露。内容分析表明，增加的披露与价值有关，而不仅仅是在丑闻发生后立即用来征服公众的强烈抗议。横断面分析进一步表明，信息披露的增加与企业对关系的依赖程度以及涉嫌丑闻的类型/严重程度呈正相关。我们得出结论，在涉及政治和公众高度敏感性的重大事件之后，增加披露是对监管和公众审查的风险和潜在成本的增加的反应。证据支持政治成本假设，并具有重要的管理和政策含义。

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