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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting, auditing & finance >Auditor Pricing of Excess Cash Holdings
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Auditor Pricing of Excess Cash Holdings

机译：多余现金控股的审计师定价

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We examine auditor business risk by analyzing the relation between excess cash holdings and auditor pricing behavior. Prior research links excess cash holdings to risks associated with manager opportunism and external monitoring. Our analyses provide evidence of a positive relationship between excess cash and audit fees. The economic magnitude of the increase in total audit fees due to an increase in excess cash holdings is approximately 5% greater for firms in the top quartile of excess cash holdings versus those in the bottom quartile. We also find that the strength of shareholder rights reduces the positive relationship between excess cash and audit fees, and excess cash holdings are assigned lower audit fees among firms that follow an investment-intensive strategy than those that tend to hold on to their cash. Our article contributes to the literature by examining auditor pricing of excess cash holdings, including factors that affect auditors' risk perceptions, and ultimately provides unique insights into how auditors view agency conflicts indicated by excess cash holdings.
机译：我们通过分析多余现金持有量与审计师定价行为之间的关系来检查审计师业务风险。先前的研究将过多的现金持有量与经理机会主义和外部监控相关的风险联系在一起。我们的分析提供了多余现金与审计费用之间正相关关系的证据。由于现金持有量过剩的增加，导致总审计费增加的经济幅度，现金持有量最高的四分位的公司与现金持有量最低的四分位的公司相比，增加了约5％。我们还发现，股东权益的优势降低了超额现金与审计费用之间的正相关关系，并且在遵循投资密集型策略的公司中，与倾向于保留现金的公司相比，分配给超额现金持有人的审计费用更低。本文通过检查审计师对超额现金持有量的定价（包括影响审计师风险感知的因素）为文献做出了贡献，并最终提供了关于审计师如何看待超额现金持有量所代表的机构冲突的独特见解。

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