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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting, auditing & finance >Internal Corporate Governance and Classification Shifting Practices: An Analysis of U.K. Corporate Behavior
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Internal Corporate Governance and Classification Shifting Practices: An Analysis of U.K. Corporate Behavior

机译：公司内部治理与分类转变实践：英国公司行为分析

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摘要

The corporate governance literature shows that strong internal corporate governance improves the monitoring of managerial discretion over accounting choices. However, most of these studies investigated the role of internal governance in a setting highly regulated through accounting standards, such as the treatment of accruals. Thus, there is little evidence available on whether internal governance collaborates or substitutes for strict accounting regulations. This study therefore investigates whether boards and audit committees also protect shareholders' interests in areas that are less regulated through generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Non-recurring items are relatively lightly regulated under International Accounting Standard Ⅰ (IAS Ⅰ) and there is increasing concern over the use of non-recurring items to mislead investors (i.e., classifying some recurring expenses as non-recurring). This study therefore investigates whether internal corporate governance constrains classification shifting. Using a sample of 713 U.K. firm-year observations, we find that high-quality internal governance, in terms of the overall quality of board and audit committees, mitigates classification shifting, suggesting therefore that strong internal governance tends to act as a substitute for strict accounting standards. In particular, it appears that long tenure and independence help to mitigate classification shifting, and more CEO directors and share ownership instead may lead to lower quality monitoring.
机译：公司治理文献表明，强大的内部公司治理可以改善对会计选择的管理自由度的监控。然而，这些研究中的大多数研究了内部治理在通过会计标准（例如权责发生制）受到高度监管的环境中的作用。因此，很少有证据表明内部治理是协作还是替代了严格的会计法规。因此，本研究调查了董事会和审计委员会是否也在通过公认会计准则（GAAP）较少监管的领域中保护股东利益。国际会计准则Ⅰ（IASⅠ）对非经常性项目的监管相对宽松，并且人们越来越关注使用非经常性项目来误导投资者（即将一些经常性费用归类为非经常性项目）。因此，本研究调查了内部公司治理是否限制了类别转移。通过对713个英国公司年度观察的样本，我们发现，就董事会和审计委员会的整体质量而言，高质量的内部治理可以缓解类别转移，因此，建议强有力的内部治理可以替代严格的内部治理。会计准则。尤其是，长期任职和独立性似乎有助于减轻类别转移，而更多的CEO董事和股份所有权可能会导致较低的质量监控。

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