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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting, auditing & finance >Discussion—An Empirical Analysis of CEO Risk Aversion and the Propensity to Smooth Earnings Volatility
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Discussion—An Empirical Analysis of CEO Risk Aversion and the Propensity to Smooth Earnings Volatility

机译：讨论—CEO风险规避和平滑收益波动倾向的实证分析

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In this discussion, I pose a few questions that, in my view, are worth considering when reading Abdel-khalik's study on the relationship between wealth-induced CEO risk aversion and performance smoothing: Does absolute or relative risk aversion matter? Is performance smoothing costly to CEOs and how do smoothing costs vary across CEO wealth levels? What is the influence of the convexity of CEOs' compensation contracts on the relationship between CEO wealth and performance volatility? Could the empirical relationship between CEO wealth and performance volatility be explained by the theoretical link between firm-specific uncertainty and CEO ownership? How is the wealth-based risk-aversion measure distributed across CEOs? Is the latent risk-aversion measure operationally different from the Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion measure? Abdelkhalik's study addresses an important research question. Answers to these questions, however, would help to better understand the implications of Abdel-khalik's empirical findings for research and practice. As noted in the introduction, I believe that Abdel-khalik's study not only provides a new explanation for performance smoothing, but also stimulates our thinking about how CEO wealth might affect the incentive effects of all types of monetary rewards. In particular, if CEOs have utility functions that exhibit decreasing utility over wealth, this should not only affect their attitudes toward firm risk but also their attitudes toward receiving monetary remuneration. Future research may address this issue.
机译：在本次讨论中，我提出一些问题，在阅读Abdel-khalik关于财富引发的CEO风险规避与绩效平滑之间的关系的研究时，我值得考虑的问题：绝对或相对规避风险重要吗？绩效平滑对CEO而言代价高昂吗，平滑成本在CEO财富水平之间如何变化？ CEO薪酬合同凸性对CEO财富与绩效波动之间的关系有何影响？能否通过企业特定的不确定性与CEO所有权之间的理论联系来解释CEO财富与绩效波动之间的经验关系？基于财富的风险规避措施如何在首席执行官之间分配？潜在的风险规避措施在操作上是否与Arrow-Pratt风险规避措施不同？ Abdelkhalik的研究解决了一个重要的研究问题。然而，回答这些问题将有助于更好地理解阿卜杜勒·哈里克的经验发现对研究和实践的意义。正如引言中所述，我相信Abdel-khalik的研究不仅为绩效平滑提供了新的解释，而且激发了我们对CEO财富如何影响所有类型的货币奖励的激励效应的思考。特别是，如果首席执行官的效用职能对财富的效用降低，这不仅会影响他们对公司风险的态度，而且还会影响他们对获得货币报酬的态度。未来的研究可能会解决这个问题。

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