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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change >Does corporate disclosure policy change financial analysts' behaviour? Evidence from France
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Does corporate disclosure policy change financial analysts' behaviour? Evidence from France

机译：公司披露政策是否会改变财务分析师的行为？来自法国的证据

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摘要

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether financial analysts are sensitive to voluntary earning disclosures. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a literature review of the relationship between analysts' behaviour and corporate disclosures. It is assumed first that analyst coverage both influences and is influenced by voluntary earning disclosures, and that second, French managers are expected to make voluntary disclosures in order to reduce market uncertainty. To test these hypotheses, a simultaneous equation model and an ordinary least square regression framework were estimated on a sample of 154 French-listed firms between 1998 and 2001. Findings – The results show that voluntary earning disclosures positively influence analyst coverage decision. They also show that voluntary disclosures improve the accuracy of analyst forecasts and reduce market uncertainty. Research limitations/implications – The paper does not cover all forms of corporate voluntary disclosures. Practical implications – The findings suggest that corporate disclosure policy is likely to change financial analysts' behaviour. The results are useful to both managers, wishing to meet market expectations and, to investors wishing to invest in richer informational environment firms. Originality/value – This paper provides original results about the role of analysts in France as information intermediaries. These analysts pay little attention to French firms with a poor information environment in which minority shareholders are less inclined to ask for costly analyst coverage.
机译：目的–本文的目的是研究金融分析师是否对自愿性收入披露敏感。设计/方法/方法-本文基于对分析师行为与公司披露之间关系的文献综述。首先假设分析师的报道既影响自愿收益披露，也受其影响；其次，法国管理人员应进行自愿披露，以减少市场不确定性。为了检验这些假设，在1998年至2001年间，对154家法国上市公司的样本进行了联立方程模型和普通最小二乘回归框架的估计。结果–结果表明，自愿性收入披露对分析师的覆盖决策具有积极影响。他们还表明，自愿披露可以提高分析师预测的准确性并减少市场不确定性。研究的局限性/含义-本文未涵盖公司自愿披露的所有形式。实际意义–研究结果表明，公司披露政策可能会改变财务分析师的行为。该结果对于希望满足市场期望的管理人员和希望在更丰富的信息环境公司中进行投资的投资者都是有用的。原创性/价值–本文提供有关法国分析师在信息中介机构中的作用的原始结果。这些分析师很少关注信息环境不佳的法国公司，在这些公司中，小股东不太愿意要求昂贵的分析师报道。

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