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Horizontal Equity Effects in Energy Regulation

机译:能源监管中的水平公平效应

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摘要

Choices in energy regulation, particularly whether and how to price externalities, can have widely different distributional consequences both across and within income groups. Traditional welfare theory focuses largely on effects across income groups; such "vertical equity" concerns can typically be addressed by a progressive redistribution of emissions revenues. In this paper, we review alternative economic perspectives that give rise to equity concerns within income groups, or "horizontal equity," and suggest operational measures. We then apply those measures to a stylized model of pollution regulation in the electricity sector. In addition, we look for ways to present the information behind those measures directly to stakeholders. We show how horizontal equity concerns might overshadow efficiency concerns in this context.
机译:能源监管的选择,尤其是是否对外部性定价以及如何为外部定价,可能会在收入群体之间和之内产生广泛不同的分配结果。传统福利理论在很大程度上侧重于不同收入群体之间的影响。通常可以通过逐步重新分配排放收入来解决此类“垂直公平”问题。在本文中,我们回顾了引起收入群体内部股权问题或“水平股权”的其他经济观点,并提出了操作措施。然后,我们将这些措施应用到电力部门污染监管的程式化模型中。此外,我们寻求直接向利益相关者展示这些措施背后的信息的方法。我们展示了在这种情况下,横向股权问题可能会掩盖效率问题。

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