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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists >Prices versus Quantities across Jurisdictions
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Prices versus Quantities across Jurisdictions

机译：各辖区的价格与数量

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摘要

We extend the standard "prices versus quantities" framework for pollution control to cover multiple heterogeneous jurisdictions interacting strategically with each other. When multi-jurisdictional externalities are present and the uncertainties among jurisdictions are independent, the regulatory game exhibits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. For any one jurisdiction, the equilibrium choice of instrument is given by the sign of the original prices versus quantities formula. Thus, it is an optimal strategy for a jurisdiction to choose a price instrument when the slope of its own marginal benefit is less than the slope of its own marginal cost and a quantity instrument when this condition is reversed. The result suggests that the original nonstrategic criterion for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities may have wider applicability to determining instrument choice in a noncooperative strategic environment.
机译：我们扩展了污染控制的标准“价格与数量”框架，以涵盖彼此进行战略性互动的多个异构管辖区。当存在多辖区外部性且辖区之间的不确定性是独立的时，监管博弈表现出独特的子博弈完美均衡。对于任何一个管辖区，工具的均衡选择均由原始价格与数量公式的符号给出。因此，当辖区自身边际收益的斜率小于其自身边际成本的斜率而选择数量工具且该条件逆转时，选择价格工具是一种最佳的策略。结果表明，价格相对于数量的比较优势的原始非战略标准可能在确定非合作性战略环境中的工具选择方面具有更广泛的适用性。

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