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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists >The Role of Party Affiliation, Lobbying, and Electoral Incentives in Decentralized US State Support of the Environment
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The Role of Party Affiliation, Lobbying, and Electoral Incentives in Decentralized US State Support of the Environment

机译:党的隶属,游说和选举激励在权力下放的美国国家支持环境中的作用

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摘要

This article investigates the influence of lobbying, electoral incentives, and US state governors’ party affiliation on environmental expenditures. A theoretical framework is presented, emphasizing the potential impact of lobbying from interest groups on environmental policies. The major causal link for environmental expenditures depends on the governor’s political preferences. Implementing a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we identify and estimate the causal effect of state governors on the level of environmental expenditures. We test whether governors tend to deviate from their own political preferences when facing pressures from polluting lobbies and electoral incentives from environmental organizations. The empirical results reveal that, when Democratic governors are in charge, environmental expenditures are, on average, higher. However, in oil-abundant states, and/or in states where polluting industries are economically important, Democratic politicians tend to allocate fewer resources to environmental preservation, suggesting that political pressure from lobbying groups matters.
机译:本文调查了游说,选举激励措施和美国州州长党派对环境支出的影响。提出了理论框架,强调从兴趣集团对环境政策的潜在影响。环境支出的主要因果关系取决于州长的政治偏好。实施回归不连续性设计(RDD),我们识别和估算国家州长对环境支出水平的因果效应。我们测试各国州长往往偏离自己的政治偏好,当面对环境组织的污染和选举激励措施。实证结果表明,当民主州长负责时,环境支出平均更高。但是,在石油丰富的国家,和/或在污染行业在经济上重要的国家,民主政治家倾向于为环境保护提供较少的资源,这表明来自游说群体的政治压力很重要。

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