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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of banking & finance >Rewarding risk-taking or skill? The case of private equity fund managers
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Rewarding risk-taking or skill? The case of private equity fund managers

机译：奖励冒险或技巧？私募股权基金经理案

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摘要

We examine whether typical private equity fund compensation contracts reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our analysis is based on a novel model of investment value, cash flows, and fee dynamics of private equity funds. Given the embedded option-like fee components, our results demonstrate that fund managers indeed have an incentive for excessive risk-taking when only fee income from the current fund is considered. However, when managers also consider potential compensation from follow-on funds, their risk-taking incentives depend on their individual skill levels, and skilled managers will have an incentive to reduce fund risk. We also show that managers must generate substantial abnormal returns in order to compensate investors for the given fee components. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：我们研究了典型的私募股权基金补偿合同是否奖励过度冒险而不是管理技巧。我们的分析基于一种新的投资价值，现金流量和私募股权基金费用动态的模型。考虑到内含类似期权的费用成分，我们的结果表明，仅考虑当前基金的费用收入，基金经理的确会冒险冒险。但是，如果经理人还考虑从后续基金获得的潜在报酬，他们的冒险动机取决于他们的个人技能水平，而熟练的经理人将有动机来降低基金风险。我们还表明，经理人必须产生可观的异常收益，以补偿给定费用部分的投资者。 （C）2017 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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