...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of banking & finance >Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis
【24h】

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

机译：战略性贷款违约与协调：实验分析

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank's expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers' expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks' fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers' coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.
机译：本文通过实验研究了银行和借款人基本面对偿还贷款的影响。我们发现，尽管银行的预期偿还能力是帕累托占主导地位的纳什均衡，但当银行的预期实力较低时，有偿债能力的借款人更有可能在战略上违约。不论银行的基本面如何，当其他借款人的预期还款能力较低时，借款人也不太可能还款。我们表明，对银行和借款人基本面的预期变化会改变借款人协调问题的风险支配性，并且这些变化随后会解释战略违约。对于个人借款人而言，厌恶损失和过往的不良经历会减少还款额，这表明银行倒闭在陷入困境时可能会传染。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号