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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making >Risk and Prisoner's Dilemma: A Reinterpretation of Coombs' Re-parameterization
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Risk and Prisoner's Dilemma: A Reinterpretation of Coombs' Re-parameterization

机译：风险与囚徒困境：对库姆斯重新参数化的重新解释

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摘要

We propose a model to measure risk in a prisoner's dilemma based on Coombs' (1973) re-parameterization of the game as an individual risk decision-making task that chooses between a gamble of cooperation and another gamble of defection. Specifically, we propose an index, r, to represent the risk associated with cooperation relative to defection. In conjunction with Rapoport's (1967) index of cooperation (K), our formulation of risk allows us to construct games that vary in risk (as indexed by r) while controlling for cooperativeness (as indexed by K). Following utility analysis that models risk seeking as a convex utility function and risk averse as a concave function, we predict that risk-seeking people cooperate more in games that the cooperation choice is more risky, whereas risk-averse people cooperate more in games that the cooperation choice is less risky. In the three studies that we varied game parameters, used different measures of risk orientation and prosocial orientation and used different experimental procedures, we found robust results supporting our predictions. Theoretical analysis of our formulation further suggests that risk and cooperativeness of a prisoner's dilemma game is not entirely independent. Games that have a higher cooperativeness index are necessarily more risky.
机译：我们基于库姆斯（Coombs，1973）对游戏的重新参数化，提出了一种衡量囚徒困境风险的模型，将其作为个人风险决策任务，在合作赌博和叛逃赌博之间进行选择。具体来说，我们提出了一个指标r，以表示与叛逃相关的合作相关的风险。结合Rapoport（1967）的合作指数（K），我们的风险表述使我们能够构建风险变化的博弈（以r索引），同时控制合作性（以K索引）。通过效用分析，将风险寻求建模为凸效用函数，将风险厌恶建模为凹函数，我们预测，寻求风险的人在游戏中的合作程度更高，合作选择更具风险，而厌恶风险的人在游戏中的合作程度更高。合作选择的风险较小。在三项研究中，我们改变了游戏参数，使用了不同的风险取向和亲社会取向测量方法，并使用了不同的实验程序，我们发现了可靠的结果支持了我们的预测。对我们的表述的理论分析进一步表明，囚徒困境博弈的风险和合作性并非完全独立。具有较高合作性指数的游戏必然更具风险。

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