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Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms

机译:符合预期:公共信息和公平规范

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摘要

What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation-that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a theory of social norms.
机译:被认为是公平的取决于上下文相关的期望。通过使用《最后通Game博弈》的修改版,我们证明了公平行为和对公平的看法都取决于对人们在某种情况下应该做什么的信念,即对规范性期望的信念。我们通过创建关于提议者可用的要约选择的信息不对称来操纵这种期望,并发现行为会相应地变化。提议者和响应者在关于哪种选择被认为是公平的信念上表现出了惊人的共识。我们讨论了这些结果如何适合社会规范理论。

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