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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Economics >Coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric and symmetric information with sales effort-dependent demand
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Coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under asymmetric and symmetric information with sales effort-dependent demand

机译:在不对称和对称信息下在闭环供应链中的协调,依赖于销售依赖的需求

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Abstract The importance of reverse supply chain has been widely recognized in past two decades. Many companies use it in order to repair, replace, reuse and recycle their used products. On the other hand, due to independence of the decisions of the members in supply chain, the coordination mechanisms like contracts, can increase profit and improve decision making in supply chain, especially when information is asymmetric and each member has confidential information. In this paper, a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain including one manufacturer, one-third party and one retailer is developed. First, we survey Stackelberg games with sales-effort dependent demand and investigate supply chain performance under the centralized and decentralized scenarios. Next, three types of contract in supply chain including two parts tariff, cost-sharing and also revenue-cost sharing are analyzed and compared under asymmetric and symmetric information. We conclude that the supply chain can be coordinated under two parts tariff and revenue-cost sharing contracts when symmetric information exists, while supply chain coordination may not be achieved under asymmetric information. Finally, we proposed numerical examples and results show that revenue-cost sharing and two parts tariff have better performances.
机译:摘要反向供应链的重要性在过去二十年中已被广泛认可。许多公司使用它来修理,更换,重用和回收它们的使用产品。另一方面,由于供应链中成员的决定的独立性,合同等协调机制可以增加利润和改善供应链的决策,特别是当信息不对称时,每个成员都有机密信息。在本文中,开发了一种三个梯度闭环供应链,包括一个制造商,三个党和一家零售商。首先,我们通过销售效率的需求调查Stackelberg游戏,并在集中式和分散的情况下调查供应链绩效。接下来,在不对称和对称信息下分析并比较包括两个零件关税,成本共享以及收入成本共享的三种类型的供应链合同。我们得出结论,当存在对称信息时,供应链可以根据关税和收入成本共享合同协调,而在不对称信息下可能无法实现供应链协调。最后,我们提出了数值例子和结果表明,收入成本分享和两部分关税具有更好的表现。

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