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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Ethics >The Risk of Fraud in Family Firms: Assessments of External Auditors
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The Risk of Fraud in Family Firms: Assessments of External Auditors

机译：家庭公司欺诈风险：对外部审计师的评估

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There is a dearth of business ethics research on family firms, despite the importance of such firms to the US economy (Vazquez in J Bus Ethics, 2016. doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3171-1). We answer Vazquez's (2016) call to examine the intersection of family-firm research and business ethics, by investigating whether external auditors assess higher risk of fraud in family firms. We test the contradictory predictions of two dominant theoretical perspectives in family-firm researchentrenchment theory and alignment theory. We conduct an experiment with highly experienced external audit professionals, who assess the risk of fraud and make client acceptance decisions for family firms versus non-family firms with different strength of corporate governance: strong versus weak audit committees (ACs). We find that auditors assess the risk of fraud as higher for family firms than for non-family firms, consistent with the predictions of entrenchment theory. Auditors are also less likely to make client acceptance recommendations for family firms. The strength of the AC moderates the family-firm effect, whereby auditors assess family firms with weak ACs to have the highest fraud risk and to be the least desirable audit clients. Our findings suggest that auditors perceive more severe agency conflicts to be present in family firms than in non-family firms, consistent with entrenchment theory, according to which family members may behave opportunistically to extract rents and potentially expropriate the firm's resources at the expense of minority shareholders.
机译：尽管这些公司对美国经济（j巴士伦理的Vazquez，2016年，但Doi：10.1007 / S10551-016-3171-1），仍有一项关于家庭公司的商业道德研究。通过调查外部审计师是否评估家庭公司的欺诈风险更高，我们回答Vazquez（2016）呼吁审查家庭康复研究和商业道德的交汇处。我们在家庭 - 坚定的研究中，测试两个主导理论观点的矛盾预测和对准理论。我们对高度经验丰富的外部审计专业人员进行了实验，他评估了欺诈风险，并使客户对家庭公司与非家庭公司具有不同实力的非家庭公司的审理决策：强大的审计委员会（ACS）。我们发现审计师对家庭企业的欺诈风险符合非家庭公司的风险，而不是非家庭公司，与侵权理论的预测一致。审计师也不太可能为家庭企业提供客户接受建议。 AC适度的强度适度，审计员评估具有弱ACS的家庭公司，以获得最高的欺诈风险，并成为最不可取的审计客户。我们的调查结果表明，审计员在家庭公司中感知到家庭公司的更严重的机构冲突，而不是在非家庭公司中符合侵权理论，根据哪些家庭成员可以机会提取租金和潜在的少数民族的资源，符合侵权理论股东。

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