• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Deterring dealer slackness: The role of supplier incentives and monitoring and the market environment
【24h】

Deterring dealer slackness: The role of supplier incentives and monitoring and the market environment

机译：威慑经销商松懈：供应商激励和监测和市场环境的作用

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

It is vital for suppliers to deter dealer slackness and to encourage dealers to work harder. However, dealer slackness has been largely overlooked in the literature. Based on agency theory, we theorize dealer slackness as a specific form of moral hazard. This research investigates the role of two supplier governance strategies, incentives, and monitoring, in inhibiting dealer slackness and the moderating effects of market uncertainty and competitive intensity. Using data from 211 dealers in China, the results indicate that supplier incentives are a useful tool to curb dealer slackness, while supplier monitoring encourages this misbehavior. The deterrent effect of supplier incentives is reinforced in a highly competitive and uncertain market. In addition, supplier monitoring reduces dealer slackness in an intensely competitive market. Overall, our research contributes to the literature by identifying a less explored form of moral hazard behavior and exploring ways to curb it.
机译：供应商可以阻止经销商松懈，并鼓励经销商更加努力地工作是至关重要的。然而，经销商的松弛在文献中已经很大程度上被忽视。基于代理理论，我们将经销商的松懈视为一种特定形式的道德风险。本研究调查了两个供应商治理策略，激励和监测的作用，抑制经销商的松懈和市场不确定性和竞争强度的调节效果。使用来自中国211名经销商的数据，结果表明供应商激励是遏制经销商松弛的有用工具，而供应商监测鼓励这种不当行为。供应商激励措施的威慑效应在竞争激烈和不确定的市场中加强。此外，供应商监控在强烈竞争激烈的市场中减少了经销商的松懈。总体而言，我们的研究通过识别不太探索的道德风险行为和探索遏制方式的探索形式，为文献造成了贡献。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号