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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Firm value and pyramidal structures: New evidence for family firms
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Firm value and pyramidal structures: New evidence for family firms

机译：公司价值和金字塔结构：家庭企业的新证据

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摘要

In this paper, we analyze what effects separating ownership and control have on the performance of a sample of 99 Chilean family-controlled firms for the period 2001-2014. Our results show an inverse U-shaped relationship between voting rights and cash flow rights divergence and firm value. This result suggests that excessive divergence of rights makes the firm's value decline and can aggravate potential conflicts of interest inside family firms. We also find a positive moderating effect of business group affiliation, which highlights the ability of business groups to attenuate the negative impact of separating rights, particularly at high levels. We also find that family CEOs exert a beneficial effect on family firm performance at lower levels of divergence of rights, but that said effect disappears as the divergence of rights increases, suggesting that, when in control, family shareholders can ensure entrenchment by installing family member CEOs.
机译：在本文中，我们分析了分离所有权和控制对2001 - 2014年期间99家智利家族控制公司的绩效的影响。我们的结果表明，投票权和现金流权发散和公司价值之间的反向U形关系。这一结果表明，权利的过度分歧使得该公司的价值下降并加剧家庭公司内部利益冲突。我们还找到了业务集团隶属关系的积极调节效果，这突出了企业集团能够减弱分离权的负面影响，特别是高水平。我们还发现家庭首席执行官对权利的差异较低的家庭企业表现产生了有益的影响，但由于权利的分歧增加，表示，当控制时，家庭股东可以通过安装家庭成员来确保壕沟的效果消失首席执行官。

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