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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis
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Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis

机译：机构所有权对股利的影响：基于代理理论的分析

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This study examines the effect of institutional ownership on dividend payouts through the lens of agency theory. We hypothesize that only institutions with certain traits are likely to monitor. Monitoring institutions will use dividend payouts as a tool to mitigate firms' agency problems, conditional on those firms' financial performance. We find that (1) there is a positive relation between lagged long-term institutional ownership with a large stake and the dividend payout ratio, (2) the positive relation is more salient in firms with high agency costs, and (3) the positive relation is more salient when external monitoring is weak These findings support that (1) concentrated and long-term institutional investors play a monitoring role and (2) monitoring institutions use dividend payouts as a monitoring device. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests, level and change models, alternative income based dividend payout measures, alternative measures of long-term institutions, and sub-period analyses. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：本研究通过代理理论的视角考察了机构所有权对股利支付的影响。我们假设只有具有某些特征的机构才有可能受到监督。监控机构将使用股息支付作为缓解公司代理问题的工具，但要以这些公司的财务绩效为条件。我们发现（1）长期持股比例较大的长期机构所有权与股利支付率之间存在正相关关系；（2）代理成本较高的公司中该正相关关系更加明显，（3）正相关性当外部监测薄弱时，这种关系更为明显。这些发现支持（1）集中和长期的机构投资者起监测作用，（2）监测机构使用股息派发作为监测工具。我们的发现对于内生性检验，水平和变化模型，基于替代收入的股利支付措施，长期机构的替代措施以及子期间分析是可靠的。 （C）2015 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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