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Incentives, opportunism and behavioral uncertainty in electricity industries

机译：电力行业的激励，机会主义和行为不确定性

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Many theories on the economics of the firm assume that economic actors are opportunistic. The focus of these theories is on the mitigation of the uncertainty that economic actors may behave opportunistically, and on the ability of contracts and governance structures to reduce this behavioral uncertainty. Previous studies did not analyze the properties of behavioral uncertainty in detail, nor did they emphasize the empirical verification of behavioral uncertainty with revealed opportunistic behavior. This article addresses both of these lacunae in the literature by focusing on incentive alignment between parties to information transactions and on empirical proof of opportunistic behavior. When a context aligns incentives, contracting parties do not behave opportunistically. When a context does not align incentives, contracting parties strategically distort or disguise information, A study of 239 regulatory decisions on dispute resolutions and enforcements of energy laws in the Dutch and French electricity industries confirms these propositions.
机译：关于企业经济学的许多理论都假定经济参与者是机会主义的。这些理论的重点是减轻经济行为者可能表现为机会主义行为的不确定性，以及合同和治理结构减少这种行为不确定性的能力。先前的研究没有详细分析行为不确定性的性质，也没有强调对具有揭示的机会主义行为的行为不确定性进行实证检验。本文通过关注信息交易各方之间的激励一致性和机会主义行为的经验证明来解决文献中的这两个空白。当情境与激励措施保持一致时，缔约方不会表现出机会主义的态度。当背景与激励措施不一致时，缔约方将战略性地歪曲或掩盖信息，一项有关239条有关荷兰和法国电力行业中的争端解决和能源法执行的监管决定的研究证实了这些主张。

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