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Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation

机译：自我报告的风险监管机制

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One problem in implementing risk regulation has to do with asymmetries in information between regulators and licensees. A possible solution is to provide incentives (e.g., more lenient standards) if violations (e.g., risk levels above some specified standard) are disclosed voluntarily by regulated firms, rather than being discovered through the regulator's monitoring efforts. This study adapts game-theoretic work in regulatory economics (where firms are usually viewed as being either compliant or non-compliant) to apply to the case of risk regulation (where firms can be described by continuously varying risk levels). This article derives equilibrium solutions for the self-reporting mechanism under different model formulations, and discusses the conditions under which these solutions are better than a traditional direct-monitoring regulatory scheme. For example, when firms can benefit (in the form of reduced costs) by increasing their risk levels, the results show that offering a loosened standard to encourage voluntary disclosure of risk levels is worthwhile only when a sufficiently large proportion of firms is believed to have high risk levels.
机译：实施风险监管的一个问题与监管机构和被许可人之间的信息不对称有关。一种可能的解决方案是，如果违规行为（例如，风险水平高于某些特定标准）是由受监管的公司自愿披露的，而不是通过监管机构的监督工作发现的，则可以提供激励措施（例如，更宽松的标准）。这项研究适用于监管经济学（通常将公司视为合规或不合规）中的博弈论工作，以适用于风险监管的情况（可以通过不断变化的风险水平来描述公司）。本文推导了在不同模型公式下自我报告机制的均衡解，并讨论了这些解比传统的直接监视监管方案更好的条件。例如，当企业可以通过提高风险水平而受益（以降低成本的形式）时，结果表明，只有在相信有足够大比例的企业拥有放松风险的标准以鼓励自愿披露风险水平时，才值得高风险水平。

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