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Upgrade pricing, market growth, and social welfare

机译：升级定价，市场增长和社会福利

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This paper studies the monopolist's dynamic pricing strategy when introducing successive generations of a durable product. We show that when consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified and the innovation is minor, the firm always offers an upgrade discount to former customers. However, the discount depends only on the quality of the old product. In contrast, for moderate and major innovations, the discount depends on the qualities and costs of both the old and the new products. The market growth rate affects the firm's pricing strategy only if consumers are anonymous; furthermore, the effect on prices depends on the discount rate and whether the market growth rate is high or low. For minor innovations, social welfare is maximized if consumers are anonymous. An interesting and paradoxical result is that, when innovations are moderate or major and consumers are semi-anonymous or exactly identified, price discrimination can actually lead to higher social welfare.
机译：当介绍连续几代耐用产品时，本文研究了垄断者的动态定价策略。我们显示出，当消费者是半匿名的或精确识别的，而创新是次要的时，公司总是向前顾客提供升级折扣。但是，折扣仅取决于旧产品的质量。相反，对于中度和重大创新，折扣取决于新产品和旧产品的质量和成本。只有当消费者是匿名的时候，市场增长率才会影响公司的定价策略。此外，对价格的影响取决于折现率以及市场增长率是高还是低。对于较小的创新，如果消费者是匿名的，则社会福利将最大化。一个有趣且自相矛盾的结果是，当创新程度适中或重大而消费者是半匿名或准确地识别出消费者时，价格歧视实际上可以带来更高的社会福利。

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