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Information sharing of value-adding retailer in a mixed channel hi-tech supply chain

机译：混合渠道高科技供应链中增值零售商的信息共享

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摘要

The mixed channel model is becoming increasingly popular in the hi-tech industry where a firm, in addition to selling through the traditional supply chain of wholesaler and retailer, opens a direct channel to the customer through Internet sales. While the dual channel has its advantages, it gives rise to channel conflict. One way of alleviating the possibility of channel conflict is proposed in this paper where the retailer is allowed to add value to the product at a cost. A per unit value-adding cost is considered and any fixed upfront cost is not included. We model this mixed channel where the manufacturer, who is assumed to have more power than the retailer, makes decision on the price of the direct product and the wholesale price it charges the retailer. The retailer makes decision about the amount of the value added and the price of the augmented product. We also take into account the fact that the manufacturer may have only incomplete information about the retailer's cost of adding value. We present this model as a game between the two parties where the manufacturer acts as the leader. We obtain managerial insights into the dual-channel supply chain based on the analytical solutions. We compare the cases of complete and incomplete information and quantify the value of information to the manufacturer. In addition, we find that the retailer would be willing to share information with the manufacturer if her cost of adding value is lower than a threshold value. We report results of numerically obtained sensitivity analysis.
机译：混合渠道模式在高科技行业变得越来越流行，在该行业中，除了通过传统的批发商和零售商供应链进行销售以外，公司还通过Internet销售为客户打开直接渠道。尽管双通道具有其优点，但它引起了通道冲突。本文提出了一种缓解渠道冲突的可能性的方法，该方法允许零售商以一定的成本为产品增加价值。考虑了每单位增值成本，不包括任何固定的前期成本。我们对这种混合渠道进行建模，在该渠道中，假定制造商的实力比零售商强，他们可以决定直接产品的价格以及向零售商收取的批发价。零售商决定增加值的数量和增强产品的价格。我们还考虑到以下事实，即制造商可能仅拥有关于零售商增加价值的成本的不完整信息。我们将这种模型展示为制造商充当领导者的两方之间的博弈。我们基于分析解决方案获得了对双渠道供应链的管理洞察力。我们比较完整和不完整信息的情况，并量化信息对制造商的价值。此外，我们发现，如果零售商的增加值成本低于阈值，则愿意与制造商共享信息。我们报告数值获得的灵敏度分析的结果。

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