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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Corporate restructuring and performance: An agency perspective on the complete buyout cycle
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Corporate restructuring and performance: An agency perspective on the complete buyout cycle

机译：公司的重组和绩效：整个收购周期的代理视角

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Leveraged buyouts are an accepted method of restructuring, but a substantial percentage of these privately held buyouts eventually return to public trading, thus defining a public-private-public cycle of ownership. Arguments supporting buyouts have pointed to positive performance changes that occur while the firm is privately held. Such improvements, according to agency theory, are the result of changes in ownership when the firm is bought out. Since ownership patterns change substantially over the buyout cycle, performance implications of the complete cycle of changes must be considered before the true value of the buyout phenomenon can be assessed. With agency theory as a foundation for hypothesis development, we examined the performance and restructuring of 39 firms over the complete buyout cycle and found that agency theory explanations of performance are generally valid throughout the buyout cycle; i.e., increased managerial ownership leads to better firm performance. Moreover, when firms reversed buyouts and returnedd to public trading, we again found support for agency theory explanations. Qualitative content analysis also supported the agency theory's prediction of restructuring emphases associated with a buyout. Overall, these results suggest that agency theory is an appropriate theoretical base for explaining managerial choices during the buyout cycle. Unexpectedly, however, agency costs that were eliminated or minimized during the private buyout period did not reappear immediately following a reverse buyout. It took several years for the predicted performance declines associated with the agency costs of public ownership to reemerge.
机译：杠杆收购是一种可以接受的重组方法，但是这些私有收购中有很大一部分最终会返回公开交易，从而确定了公有-私有-公共所有权的周期。支持买断的论点表明，当公司为私人控股时，会发生积极的业绩变化。根据代理理论，这种改进是公司被收购时所有权变化的结果。由于所有权模式在整个收购周期中都会发生重大变化，因此在评估收购现象的真实价值之前，必须考虑整个变化周期的性能影响。以代理理论作为假设发展的基础，我们研究了39个公司在整个收购周期中的绩效和重组，发现代理理论对绩效的解释在整个收购周期中通常是有效的。即，增加的管理层所有权会导致更好的公司绩效。此外，当公司撤回买断并返回公开交易时，我们再次获得了对代理理论解释的支持。定性内容分析还支持代理理论对与收购相关的重点重组的预测。总体而言，这些结果表明，代理理论是解释收购周期中管理者选择的适当理论基础。但是，出乎意料的是，在反向收购之后，在私有收购期间消除或最小化的代理成本并没有立即出现。与公共所有权的代理成本相关的预期绩效下降花了好几年时间才能重新出现。

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