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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies >Low-carbonization game analysis and optimization in a two-echelon supply chain under the carbon-tax policy
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Low-carbonization game analysis and optimization in a two-echelon supply chain under the carbon-tax policy

机译:碳税政策下两级供应链的低碳化博弈分析与优化

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摘要

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to help governments make carbon-tax policy and help enterprises make decisions under that policy. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the carbon-tax policy, with the consideration of consumers' low-carbon preferences, this paper compares the pricing, emission reduction and advertising decisions in three different games (one centralized game and two decentralized Stackelberg games). Findings - This paper concludes that, through centralized game, namely, cooperation game, manufacturers, retailers and consumers can reach their optimal situatioa In the numerical simulation, this paper analyzes the impact of carbon-tax rate to the decisions of manufacturer and retailer, as well as their profit. Originality/value - Using the Nash Bargaining Model, the introduction of the bargaining power and the degree of risk aversion of the parties, this study provides some solution for the distribution of the additional profit when they cooperate, in which way they can reach their Pareto optimality.
机译:目的-这项研究的目的是帮助政府制定碳税政策,并帮助企业根据该政策做出决策。设计/方法/方法-基于碳税政策,考虑到消费者的低碳偏好,本文比较了三种不同游戏(一个集中式游戏和两个分散式Stackelberg游戏)的定价,减排和广告决策。研究结果-本文得出的结论是,通过集中化博弈,即合作博弈,制造商,零售商和消费者可以达到其最佳状态。在数值模拟中,本文分析了碳税率对制造商和零售商决策的影响,如下所示:以及他们的利润。独创性/价值-使用纳什讨价还价模型,讨价还价能力的引入以及当事方的风险规避程度,本研究为合作伙伴分配额外利润时提供了一些解决方案,使他们可以达成自己的帕累托最优性。

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