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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Civil Engineering and Management >SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS
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SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS

机译：基于进化博弈论的建筑工程施工企业质量监督系统动力学模型

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摘要

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants' interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty-reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC's rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty-reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed modeL The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.
机译：为了弥补这一差距，即很少有研究探讨参与者之间的相互作用在建筑质量监督中的影响，本文提出了一种基于进化博弈论的系统动力学模型，以描述三方利益相关者之间复杂而动态的相互作用。中国，包括项目所有者（PO），施工监督工程师（CSE）和施工承包商（CC）。首先，根据费用目标建立复制的动态方程组。其次，获得方程组的平衡解以测试策略选项。还分析了由罚金和奖励变化引起的系统波动趋势。最后，通过将动态罚金奖励方案集成到采购订单的演化策略中，改善了所提出模型的稳定性。仿真结果表明：1）初始交互作用中不存在进化稳定策略； 2）罚分和报酬的程度对CC的速率变量有很大影响； 3）动态罚分情形可以有效地提高建议算法的稳定性。模式质量监督体系的不稳定和稳定性控制方案可以帮助理解利益相关者之间的相互作用的影响，并为优化质量监督程序提供建议。

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