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Incentive model for enterprises based on carbon emission intensity

机译：基于碳排放强度的企业激励模型

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摘要

A pilot scheme for a carbon emissions trading market has been launched in China. Some problems within the market include insufficient incentives, inefficient emissions reduction, and inequitable distribution. While previous studies adopted a state or provincial level perspective to examine such issues, little research has focused on enterprises at a business level. This article proposes a new incentive model that aims to resolve these problems. This model was developed while considering the carbon emission intensity of enterprises and cooperative game theory. According to the advanced value and average value of carbon emission intensity, the model classifies enterprises into three regions. The quota in the second year is related to its own emission intensity and the number of enterprises located in the region, which not only stimulates the enthusiasm of the enterprise to reduce emissions, but also serves to encourage more enterprises to participate in emission reductions. This article presents a study of 16 textile enterprises in Shandong Province. Depending on the model's calculation, the quota can be redistributed. Different emission intensity brings different emission reduction costs, which can intuitively show different responsibilities. The result is fairer and more reasonable than distributions that are based on a historical emissions quota. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：中国已经启动了碳排放交易市场试点计划。市场上的一些问题包括激励措施不足，减排效率低下以及分配不均。尽管以前的研究采用州或省一级的观点来研究此类问题，但很少有研究集中于企业级别的企业。本文提出了一种旨在解决这些问题的新激励模型。该模型是在考虑企业碳排放强度和合作博弈理论的基础上开发的。根据碳排放强度的先进值和平均值，该模型将企业分为三个区域。第二年的配额与其自身的排放强度和该地区的企业数量有关，这不仅激发了企业减少排放的积极性，而且还鼓励了更多的企业参与减排。本文对山东省16家纺织企业进行了研究。根据模型的计算，可以重新分配配额。不同的排放强度会带来不同的减排成本，从而可以直观地体现出不同的责任。与基于历史排放配额的分配相比，结果更公平，更合理。 （C）2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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