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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of comparative economics >Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles
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Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles

机译：规则与规范：如何形式和非正式机构如何构成司法量刑周期

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摘要

Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles consistently finds that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. However, this research finding had previously drawn exclusively on data from four states. Using newly collected sentencing data on seven additional states, we find substantial, and previously un-noted, heterogeneity in the strength of sentencing cycles. This heterogeneity appears to be explained by cross-state differences in informal norm of whether incumbent judges get challenged in judicial elections. We show that variation is explain by the baseline probability of having a challenger and the number of donations per electoral race. That variation, in turn, is not well explained by observable formal electoral institutions.
机译：然而，这项研究发现以前从四个州的数据完全绘制。 在额外的七个国家使用新收集的判决数据，我们发现了大量的，先前未指出的，异质性在判刑周期的强度。 这种异质性似乎通过非正式规范的跨国差异来解释，无论是否在司法选举中受到挑战。 我们表明，通过挑战者和每选赛量捐款数量的基线概率，变化是解释的。 反过来，这种变化并不是通过可观察的正式选举机构解释的。

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