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Trust and delegation: Theory and evidence

机译：信任与委托：理论与证据

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摘要

Social trust is associated with good economic performance, but little is known about the transmission mechanisms connecting trust and performance. We explore the effect of trust on delegation decisions. In a theoretical framework, we note that delegation is a low-cost option when management decisions can be implemented without monitoring. This option is, however, risky and more likely to be profitable in higher-trust environments. In a set of cross-country regressions, we show a strong association between trust and delegation, which is increasing in of sophistication. Journal of Comparative Economics 45 (2017) 644-657. School of Business and Management Sciences, Istanbul Medipol University, Kavacik Mahallesi Ekinciler Caddesi No. 19, 34810 Beykoz-Istanbul, Turkey; Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Alle 5, DK-8200 Aarhus V, Denmark. (C) 2016 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：社会信任与良好的经济绩效有关，但对将信任与绩效联系起来的传递机制知之甚少。我们探讨了信任对委派决定的影响。在理论框架中，我们注意到当管理决策无需监视即可实施时，委派是一种低成本的选择。但是，此选项具有较高的风险，并且在信任度较高的环境中更有可能获利。在一组跨国回归中，我们显示出信任与委托之间的紧密联系，而这种联系正日益复杂。比较经济学杂志45（2017）644-657。伊斯坦布尔Medipol大学工商管理学院，Kavacik Mahallesi Ekinciler Caddesi No. 19，34810 Beykoz-Istanbul，土耳其；奥尔胡斯大学经济与贸易系，丹麦奥胡斯五世DK-8200，Fuglesangs Alle 5。 （C）2016年比较经济研究协会。由Elsevier Inc.出版。保留所有权利。

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