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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of computer security >Collusion attacks and fair time-locked deposits for fast-payment transactions in Bitcoin
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Collusion attacks and fair time-locked deposits for fast-payment transactions in Bitcoin

机译：串通攻击和公平的时间锁定存款，用于比特币中的快速付款交易

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In Bitcoin network, the distributed storage of multiple copies of the block chain opens up possibilities for double-spending, i.e., a payer issues two separate transactions to two different payees transferring the same coins. While Bitcoin has inherent security mechanism to prevent double-spending attacks, it requires a certain amount of time to detect the double-spending attacks after the transaction has been initiated. Therefore, it is impractical to protect the payees from suffering in double-spending attacks in fast payment scenarios where the time between the exchange of currency and goods or services is shorten to few seconds. Although we cannot prevent double-spending attacks immediately for fast payments, decentralized non-equivocation contracts have been proposed to penalize the malicious payer after the attacks have been detected. The basic idea of these contracts is that the payer locks some coins in a deposit when he initiates a transaction with the payee. If the payer double-spends, a cryptographic primitive called accountable assertions can be used to reveal his Bitcoin credentials for the deposit. Thus, the malicious payer could be penalized by the loss of deposit coins. However, such decentralized non-equivocation contracts are subjected to collusion attacks where the payer colludes with the beneficiary of the depoist and transfers the Bitcoin deposit back to himself when he double-spends, resulting in no penalties. On the other hand, even if the beneficiary behaves honestly, the victim payee cannot get any compensation directly from the deposit in the original design. To prevent such collusion attacks, we design fair time-locked deposits for Bitcoin transactions to defend against double-spending. The fair deposits ensure that the payer will be penalized by the loss of his deposit coins if he double-spends and the victim payee’s loss will be compensated within a locked time period. We start with the protocols of making a deposit for one transaction. In particular, for the transaction with single input and output and the transaction with multiple inputs and outputs, we provide different designs of the deposits. We analyze the performance of deposits made for one transaction and show how the fair deposits work efficiently in Bitcoin. We also provide protocols of making a deposit for multiple transactions, which can reduce the burdens of a honest payer. In the end, we extend the fair deposits to non-equivocation contracts for other distributed systems.
机译：在比特币网络中，区块链的多个副本的分布式存储为双花开辟了可能性，即付款人向转移相同硬币的两个不同的收款人发出两次单独的交易。尽管比特币具有固有的安全机制来防止双重支出攻击，但在交易开始后，它需要一定的时间来检测双重支出攻击。因此，在将货币与商品或服务的交换之间的时间缩短到几秒钟的快速付款方案中，保护收款人免受双重支出攻击是不切实际的。尽管我们无法立即阻止双重支出攻击以实现快速付款，但已提出分散的非抵押合同以在检测到攻击后对恶意付款人进行惩罚。这些合同的基本思想是，付款人在与收款人进行交易时将一些硬币锁定在存款中。如果付款人双花，可以使用称为负责断言的加密原语来显示其存款的比特币凭证。因此，恶意的付款人可能会因存款硬币的损失而受到惩罚。但是，这样的分散式非抵押合同会遭受共谋攻击，在这种情况下，付款人与伪装者的受益人串通，并在他两次花钱时将比特币存款转回自己，因此不会受到任何处罚。另一方面，即使受益人的行为诚实，受害人的收款人也无法直接从原始设计的保证金中获得任何补偿。为了防止此类串谋攻击，我们为比特币交易设计了公平的定期存款，以防止双重支出。合理的存款保证了付款人双倍支出时，付款人将损失其存款硬币，并且受害人的受款人的损失将在锁定时间内得到补偿。我们从为一笔交易进行存款的协议开始。特别是，对于具有单个输入和输出的交易以及具有多个输入和输出的交易，我们提供了不同的存款设计。我们分析了一笔交易的存款表现，并展示了公平存款如何在比特币中有效地运作。我们还提供了多种交易存款的协议，可以减轻诚实付款人的负担。最后，我们将公平保证金扩展到其他分布式系统的非抵押合同。

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