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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of cryptographic engineering >Synchronous sampling and clock recovery of internal oscillators for side channel analysis and fault injection
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Synchronous sampling and clock recovery of internal oscillators for side channel analysis and fault injection

机译:内部振荡器的同步采样和时钟恢复,用于侧通道分析和故障注入

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Measuring power consumption for side channel analysis typically uses an oscilloscope, which measures the data relative to an internal sample clock. By synchronizing the sampling clock to the clock of the target device, the sample rate requirements are considerably relaxed; the attack will succeed with a much lower sample rate. This work characterizes the performance of a synchronous sampling system attacking a modern microcontroller running a software AES implementation. This attack is characterized under four conditions: with a stable crystal oscillator-based clock, with a clock that is randomly varied between 3.9 and 13 MHz, with an internal oscillator that is randomly varied between 7.2 and 8.1 MHz, and with an internal oscillator that has slight random variation due to natural 'drift' in the oscillator. Traces captured with the synchronous sampling technique can be processed with a standard Differential Power Analysis style attack in all four cases, whereas when an oscilloscope is used only the stable oscillator setup is successful. This work also develops the hardware to recover the internal clock of a device which does not have an externally available clock. It is possible to implement this scheme in software only, allowing it to work with existing oscilloscope-based test environments. Performing the recovery in hardware allows the use of fault injection with excellent temporal stability relative to a sensitive event. This is demonstrated with a power glitch inserted into a microcontroller, where the glitch is triggered based on a signature in the measured power consumption.
机译:测量用于旁通道分析的功耗通常使用示波器,该示波器测量相对于内部采样时钟的数据。通过将采样时钟与目标设备的时钟同步,可以大大降低采样率要求;攻击将以低得多的采样率成功。这项工作的特点是同步采样系统的性能攻击了运行软件AES实现的现代微控制器。这种攻击的特征有以下四种:基于稳定的基于晶体振荡器的时钟,在3.9和13 MHz之间随机变化的时钟,在7.2和8.1 MHz之间随机变化的内部振荡器,以及内部振荡器由于振荡器中的自然“漂移”而具有轻微的随机变化。在所有四种情况下,都可以使用标准差分功率分析风格的攻击来处理用同步采样技术捕获的迹线,而使用示波器时,只有稳定的振荡器设置才能成功。这项工作还开发了硬件来恢复没有外部可用时钟的设备的内部时钟。可以仅在软件中实施此方案,从而使其可以与现有的基于示波器的测试环境一起使用。在硬件中执行恢复允许使用相对于敏感事件具有出色的时间稳定性的故障注入。通过在微控制器中插入电源毛刺可以证明这一点,其中,毛刺是基于测得的功耗中的信号触发的。

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