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A Formal Analysis of Prefetching in Profiled Cache-Timing Attacks on Block Ciphers

机译:对块密码的分析缓存定时攻击预取的正式分析

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Formally bounding side-channel leakage is important to bridge the gap between theory and practice in cryptography. However, bounding side-channel leakages is difficult because leakage in a cryptosystem could be from several sources. Moreover, the amount of leakage from a source may vary depending on the implementation of the cipher and the form of attack. To formally analyze the security of a cryptosystem, it is therefore essential to consider each source of leakage independently. This paper considers data prefetching, which is used in most modern day cache memories to reduce miss penalty. We build a framework that would help computer architects theoretically gauge the impact of a data prefetcher in time-driven cache attacks early in the design phase. The framework computes leakage due to the prefetcher using a metric that is based on the Kullback-Leibler transformation. We use the framework to analyze two commonly used prefetching algorithms, namely sequential and arbitrary-stride prefetching. These form the basis of several other prefetching algorithms. We also demonstrate its use by designing a new prefetching algorithm called even-odd prefetcher that does not have leakage in time-driven cache attacks.
机译:正式边界侧通道泄漏对于弥合密码学中的理论与实践之间的差距很重要。然而,缺点侧通道泄漏是困难的,因为密码系统中的泄漏可能来自几个来源。此外,来自源的泄漏量可以根据密码的实现和攻击形式而变化。要正式分析密码系统的安全性,因此必须独立地考虑每个泄漏来源。本文考虑了数据预取,该数据预取在大多数现代的高速缓存记忆中,以减少小姐罚款。我们构建一个有助于计算机架构师理论上的框架,从理论上衡量数据预取器在设计阶段的早期时间驱动缓存攻击中的影响。框架使用基于Kullback-Leibler变换的指标来计算由于预取器引起的泄漏。我们使用框架来分析两个常用的预取算法,即顺序和任意行程预取。这些构成了其他几种预取算法的基础。我们还通过设计一种名为偶数奇数预取的预取算法来展示其使用,该算法在时间驱动的缓存攻击中没有泄漏。

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