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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization >Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services

机译：奖金可以克服道德风险吗？来自市场的专家服务的实验证据

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摘要

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability, we add the possibility for clients to make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation concerns achieves the highest rate of truthful advice, we observe a similar effect, when the bonus is combined with one of them. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation, decreasing moral hazard.
机译：玩家与私人信息之间的互动和对立的利益往往容易产生不良建议和低效的结果，例如金融或保健服务市场。在欺骗游戏中，我们通过实验研究了哪些因素可以改善建议质量。除了顾问竞争和可识别性之外，我们还增加了客户在观察建议质量后自愿付款，奖金的可能性。尽管竞争和声誉方面的问题结合起来能获得最高的真实建议率，但当奖金与其中一项结合时，我们观察到了类似的效果。因此，我们的结果表明，自愿成分可以替代竞争或声誉，从而减少道德风险。

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