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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization >Elections, ability, and candidate honesty
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Elections, ability, and candidate honesty

机译：选举，能力和候选人诚实

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摘要

An important function of elections is to select the best representative, a task facilitated when candidates are honest about their qualifications. But are they? To what extent do candidates' claims depend on the alignment of incentives between themselves and voters? We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment in which candidates can choose to be honest or to exaggerate, varying the benefits of winning office. We find that strong office motives clearly induce exaggeration and, surprisingly, that only about half of laboratory candidates tell the truth even when incentives are completely aligned. We show that the prevalence of lying in elections results not from impure (e.g., Machiavellian) motives, but rather as a rational response to the expectation that other candidates will lie. Although honesty and integrity are desirable virtues in elected officials, our experiment suggests that the nature of electoral processes can make dishonesty endemic to the democratic selection of leaders. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：选举的一项重要功能是选择最佳代表，当候选人对自己的资格诚实时，这项工作将很容易进行。但是，是吗？候选人的主张在多大程度上取决于他们自己与选民之间激励措施的一致性？我们进行激励实验室实验，候选人可以选择诚实或夸大其词，从而改变赢得办公室的好处。我们发现，强烈的办公室动机显然会夸大其词，而且令人惊讶的是，即使动机完全一致，也只有大约一半的实验室候选人能说实话。我们表明，在选举中普遍存在的谎言并非源于不纯正的动机（例如，马基雅维利），而是对其他候选人将撒谎的期望的理性回应。尽管诚实和正直是民选官员的美德，但我们的实验表明，选举过程的性质可能使不诚实的行为成为领导者民主选举的普遍现象。 （C）2018 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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