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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization >Elements of emission market design: An experimental analysis of California's market for greenhouse gas allowances
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Elements of emission market design: An experimental analysis of California's market for greenhouse gas allowances

机译：排放市场设计要素：对加州温室气体排放配额市场的实验分析

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摘要

We use a set of economic experiments to test the effects of some novel features of California's new controls on greenhouse gas emissions. The California cap and trade scheme imposes limits on allowance ownership, uses a tiered price containment reserve sale, and settles allowance auctions based on the lowest accepted bid. We examine the effects of these features on market liquidity, efficiency, and price variability. We find that tight holding limits substantially reduce banking, which, in turn reduces market liquidity. This impairs the ability of traders to smooth prices over time, resulting in lower efficiency and higher price variability. The price containment reserve, while increasing the supply of allowances available to traders, does not appear to mitigate the effects of tight holding limits on market outcomes. As a result, the imposition of holding limits in the allowance market may have the consequence of increasing the likelihood of the market manipulation that they were intended to prevent. Finally, we find that the choice between lowest accepted bid and highest rejected bid for the allowance auction pricing rule does not have a significant effect on market outcomes.
机译：我们使用一组经济实验来测试加利福尼亚新控制措施对温室气体排放的某些新颖功能的影响。加利福尼亚的上限和交易计划对配额所有权施加了限制，使用了分层的价格遏制储备销售，并根据接受的最低出价结算了配额拍卖。我们研究了这些功能对市场流动性，效率和价格可变性的影响。我们发现，严格的持有限额会大大减少银行业务，从而减少市场流动性。这削弱了交易者随时间推移使价格平稳的能力，从而导致效率降低和价格波动性增大。价格遏制储备在增加交易者可用配额的供应的同时，似乎并未减轻严格的持有限额对市场结果的影响。结果，在配额市场上施加持仓限额可能会导致其打算防止的市场操纵可能性增加。最后，我们发现配额拍卖定价规则的最低接受出价和最高拒绝出价之间的选择对市场结果没有显着影响。

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