...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection
【24h】

Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection

机译：逆向选择下的摩擦资产重新分配

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper studies asset reallocation in over-the-counter markets subject to search, bargaining, and information frictions, and discusses their implications for optimal monetary policy. The results show that inefficiencies arise from trade under private information, resulting in reduced trading volume and consumption. Conditional on search frictions in the over-the-counter market, information frictions can be both welfare-decreasing and welfare increasing, addressing the pecuniary externality arising from the portfolio choice of liquid and illiquid assets. Optimality is guaranteed under the Friedman rule. Away from the Friedman rule, efficiency can be restored through open market operations, exchanging information-sensitive assets for risk-free bonds, as conducted by the Federal Reserve in response to the global financial crisis. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：本文研究了受搜索，讨价还价和信息摩擦影响的场外市场中的资产重新分配，并讨论了它们对最优货币政策的影响。结果表明，私人信息下的贸易导致效率低下，从而导致交易量和消费减少。以场外市场的搜索摩擦为条件，信息摩擦既可以减少福利也可以增加福利，从而解决了流动性和非流动性资产的投资组合选择所引起的货币外部性。在弗里德曼规则下可以保证最优性。除了弗里德曼法则，可以通过公开市场操作，将信息敏感资产交换为无风险债券来恢复效率，就像美联储针对全球金融危机所做的那样。 （C）2019 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号