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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Designing optimal M&A strategies under uncertainty
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Designing optimal M&A strategies under uncertainty

机译：在不确定性下设计最佳的并购策略

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摘要

The recent surge in M&A activities highlights firms' motivation to gain or maintain market leadership. Along with the unparalleled volume of M&As, more and more firms favor establishing acquisition programs that lead to multiple subsequent M&As over time. In this paper, we study the entrance in a market by means of M&A when different strategies to acquire a prominent incumbent are available to the acquirer. In particular, the firm might opt for a big leap, where it acquires the prominent incumbent; the alternative is to design an acquisition program that allows moving in small steps by acquiring a minor company first and the larger prominent player later on. We employ a dynamic game-theoretic real options model to investigate the effect of uncertainty and synergies on the strategy choices and also consider alternative contract designs for the acquisition program, such as hostile, friendly or mixed. Our findings reveal that firms prefer acquisition programs to big leap strategies when the industry exhibits high levels of uncertainty and can occur even when the acquisition of the first target destroys value. Moreover, some acquisition programs profit from a first mover pass-through where the acquirer can jointly utilize his first-mover advantage when negotiating with multiple targets. Finally, novel testable hypotheses are derived from the model. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：最近并购活动的激增突出了公司的获得或维持市场领导的动机。除了无与伦比的M＆等，越来越多的公司荣获建立收购计划，导致多次随后的M和随着时间的推移。在本文中，我们通过M＆A研究市场的入口，当收购方可以获得不同的策略。特别是，该公司可能会选择一个大的飞跃，在那里它获得了突出的现任;替代方案是设计一个采集程序，允许通过在稍后获得一个小公司和更大的突出播放器来通过获取小型公司来移动较小的步骤。我们采用动态游戏理论实际选择模型来调查不确定性和协同作用对战略选择的影响，并考虑收购方案的替代合同设计，例如敌对，友好或混合。我们的调查结果表明，当行业表现出高水平的不确定性时，公司更倾向于收购计划到大跃策略，即使收购第一目标破坏价值，也可能发生。此外，一些收购方案从第一届搬家者通过时，获取者可以在谈判与多个目标谈判时共同利用他的先发制人优势。最后，新的可测试假设来自模型。 （c）2019 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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