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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market
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Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market

机译：投资时间和能力决策与二浦市场的时间到建设

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摘要

In this study, we investigate optimal investment timing and capacity decisions in the presence of time-to-build and competition. Due to uncertain time-to-build, a leader, who invests first, may have its product enter the market after a follower's. We show that a dominated firm with the longer time-to-build can become a leader by making the investment earlier than a dominant firm with shorter investment lags. The leader's capacity choice increases with the dominated firm's time-to-build, even if the dominated entity is the leader. This finding is consistent with the observation in the electric vehicles market in which a relatively new firm with little experience of mass production makes aggressive investment early on, while the biggest carmakers capable of mass production are timing their investment. With a welfare-maximizing policy, however, the dominant firm with the shorter time-to-build always becomes the leader. There is a significant loss of social welfare with the dominated firm being the leader, and the loss increases with the asymmetry of time-to-build. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：在这项研究中，我们调查了在建立时间和竞争方面的最佳投资时间和能力决策。由于不确定的时间来制造，首先投资的领导者可能会在追随者之后进入市场。我们表明，通过较短的投资滞后的占优势公司提前投资，可以成为较长的建筑物的主导公司可以成为领导者。即使主导的实体是领导者，领导者的能力选择也随着占据的公司的时间来增加而增加。这一发现与电动汽车市场的观察相一致，其中一个具有批量生产经验的相对较新的公司，早期投入积极投资，而能够大规模生产的最大汽车制造商正在进行其投资。然而，凭借福利最大化的政策，较短的时间越来越庞大的公司总是成为领导者。主导公司是领导者的主导公司存在重大的社会福利，并且随着时间的不对称，损失增加。 （c）2020 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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