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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Advertising patterns in a dynamic oligopolistic growing market with decay
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Advertising patterns in a dynamic oligopolistic growing market with decay

机译：广告模式在动态寡头垄断生长市场与衰减

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摘要

A finite-horizon Lanchester model of a (continuous-time) differential game of oligopolistic advertising is considered, and the analytical form of the unique closed-loop Nash equilibrium derived and analyzed. In contrast to previous research, the finite-horizon Lanchester model is modified to include two novel factors. First, a growing market allows us to analyze the competition for a potential market via generic advertising, with the latter giving the otherwise zero-sum-like game a public good dimension. Second, it is assumed that each firm's market share declines in the absence of advertising efforts. The analysis investigates the Markovian (closed-loop) equilibrium calling for firms operating in a competitive growing market to invest in offensive, defensive or generic advertising in all or part of the decision horizon. In the most novel part of the paper, the non-cooperative outcome is compared to the Pareto-optimal or cooperative solution. The conclusions derived reveal significant differences in the resulting patterns of co-existence of the different dimensions of advertising over time, relative to the existing literature. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：考虑了（连续时间）寡头垄断广告差分游戏的有限范围兰德特模型，以及独特的闭环纳什均衡的分析形式衍生和分析。与先前的研究相比，有限地平线兰德特模型被修改为包括两种新因素。首先，越来越多的市场使我们能够通过通用广告分析潜在市场的竞争，后者给出了其他零级游戏的公共良好维度。其次，假设在没有广告努力的情况下，每个公司的市场份额下降。分析调查了马尔可维亚（闭环）均衡呼叫在竞争力的日益增长的市场中运营的公司，在所有或部分决策范围内投资进攻，防守或通用广告。在本文最具新颖的部分中，将非合作结果与帕累托 - 最佳或合作解决方案进行比较。结论得出的结论揭示了所产生的不同方面的相对于现有文献所产生的不同方面的相同模式的模式的显着差异。 （c）2021 elestvier b.v.保留所有权利。

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