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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model
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To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model

机译：纾困还是纾困？基于代理的模型的答案

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摘要

Since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially assist EU member states in taxpayer-funded bail-outs. These crisis resolutions are often accompanied by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels. The question of how to resolve failing financial institutions, and how this depends on economic preconditions, is therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance. In this work we employ an agent-based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant crisis resolution mechanisms. To establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a series of key stylized facts of the financial and real economy. The distressed institution can either be closed via a purchase & assumption transaction, it can be bailed-out using taxpayer money, or it may be bailed-in in a debt-to-equity conversion. We find that for an economy characterized by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution. For economies in recession with high unemployment the bail-in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism. Under no circumstances do taxpayer-funded bail-out schemes outperform bail-ins with private sector involvement.
机译：自2008年金融危机爆发以来，已经花费了近半万亿欧元，以财政援助方式帮助欧盟成员国进行由纳税人资助的纾困。这些危机解决方案通常伴随着紧缩计划，从而在国内和国际两级引起政治和社会摩擦。因此，如何解决破产的金融机构以及如何依赖于经济前提条件的问题是一个具有重大政治意义的紧迫而有争议的问题。在这项工作中，我们采用基于主体的模型来研究三种高度相关的危机解决机制的经济和金融影响。为了确定模型的有效性，我们表明它重现了金融和实体经济的一系列关键程式化事实。陷入困境的机构既可以通过购买与承担交易来关闭，也可以使用纳税人的资金来纾困，也可以通过债转股来纾困。我们发现，对于一个以低失业率和高生产率为特征的经济体而言，关于金融稳定和经济生产率的最佳危机解决方案是关闭陷入困境的机构。对于失业率高的经济衰退国家，纾困工具提供了最有效的危机解决机制。在任何情况下，由纳税人资助的纾困计划都不会超过私营部门参与的纾困计划。

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  • 来源
    《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》 |2015年第1期|144-154|共11页
  • 作者

    Peter Klimek; Sebastian Poledna; J. Doyne Farmer; Stefan Thurner;

  • 作者单位

    Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 23, A-1090, Austria;

    Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 23, A-1090, Austria;

    Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford School and Mathematical Institute, Eagle House, Walton Well Rd., University of Oxford OX2 3ED, UK,Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA;

    Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 23, A-1090, Austria,Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA,IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, A 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Agent-based model; Bail-in; Bail-out; Crisis resolution;

    机译：基于代理的模型;保释;纾困;危机解决;

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