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Social security and two-earner households

机译：社会保障和两口之家

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In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution done by the following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor's benefit provisions, US Social Security system redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households. Since retirement benefits are a concave function of past mean earnings, the system redistributes from high earners to low earners. Finally, existence of a cap on social security taxable earnings makes the system regressive. This paper quantifies redistributive, labor supply, and welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving. Elimination of these policies results in a 5.5% rise in labor force participation of married females, while increasing aggregate welfare by 0.4%. A majority of households experience positive gains in welfare. Single-earner married households incur large welfare losses (as big as 1.1%), whereas two-earner households with high skilled spouses experience substantial welfare gains (as big as 1.9%). (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：在过去的几十年中，在美国取消了现收现付制的广泛讨论和研究。这种消除也将消除以下社会保障政策造成的代际重新分配。由于配偶和遗属的福利规定，美国社会保障体系（主要）重新分配给单身已婚家庭。由于退休金是过去平均收入的隐性函数，因此系统将从高收入者重新分配给低收入者。最后，社会保障应税收入上限的存在使该系统回归。本文使用一般均衡生命周期模型量化了这些政策的再分配，劳动力供给和福利含义。代理人开始时是永久结婚或单身，受教育程度和工资状况不同，后者取决于教育和性别。家庭是决策者，并决定其成员的劳动力供应和储蓄。取消这些政策将导致已婚女性的劳动力参与度增加5.5％，而总福利增加0.4％。大多数家庭的福利得到了积极的提高。单身已婚家庭蒙受巨大的福利损失（高达1.1％），而拥有高技能配偶的两身家庭则获得了可观的福利收益（高达1.9％）。 （C）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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