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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games
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The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

机译：自治和指数折现无限水平微分对策的局部可分反馈纳什均衡的内在比较动力学

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摘要

The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided.
机译：对于普遍存在的一类自治的和指数折现的无限地平线微分博弈，推导了局部可微分反馈纳什均衡的比较动力学。所产生的可辩驳的含义是上述一类差分游戏所固有的，因此形成了其基本的，可通过经验测试的特性。讨论了它们与现存关系的最优控制理论和静态博弈论。在瞬时收益和过渡函数上确定了可分离性条件，在这些条件下，固有的比较动力学形式上就崩溃了，出现了最优控制问题。提供了结果在资本积累和粘性价格博弈中的应用。

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