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Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes

机译：马尔可夫完善的资本税和劳动税

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This paper analyzes the Markov-perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices, uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good. The main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains. If agents' preference for the public good is sufficiently high, then capital is confiscated. Setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation, but some implementations carry a high welfare cost. Allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the U.S. economy.
机译：本文分析了经济的马尔可夫完美均衡，这是一个仁慈的政府，缺乏承诺未来政策选择的能力，使用资本和劳动收入税来提供公共物品。主要发现是，政府对资本征税并补贴了劳动力，因此仅保留了未来资本税的动态低效。如果代理人对公共物品的偏好足够高，那么资本将被没收。设置税率界限可以减轻资本税固有的动态效率低下，但某些实施方式会带来较高的福利成本。允许内生的资本利用使当前的资本税产生扭曲，并意味着资本和劳动税率相对接近于美国经济所测得的水平。

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