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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >A dynamic model of shirking and unemployment: Private saving, public debt, and optimal taxation
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A dynamic model of shirking and unemployment: Private saving, public debt, and optimal taxation

机译：逃避和失业的动态模型：私人储蓄，公共债务和最优税收

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摘要

This paper introduces private saving and public debt into the shirking-unemployment model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), while relaxing their exclusive focus on steady states. After generalizing their no-shirking constraint to accommodate asset accumulation, and demonstrating that the resulting economy's equilibrium is saddle-path stable, we use our dynamic model to obtain significant departures from the Shapiro-Stiglitz prescriptions for optimal policy. Most notably, wage income should be taxed (not subsidized) in the long run if the labor market is sufficiently distorted. Furthermore, interest income should be (exhaustively) taxed only during an initial interval of time, as in Chamley's (1986) full-employment model.
机译：本文将私人储蓄和公共债务引入到Shapiro和Stiglitz（1984）的逃避失业模型中，同时放宽了他们对稳态的关注。在概括了他们的不逃避约束以适应资产积累，并证明了由此产生的经济平衡是马鞍型路径稳定后，我们使用动态模型从Shapiro-Stiglitz处方中获得了最佳政策的重大偏离。最值得注意的是，如果劳动力市场充分扭曲，从长远来看，应该对工资收入征税（而不是补贴）。而且，利息收入仅应在最初的时间间隔内（详尽地）征税，就像Chamley（1986）的全职模型一样。

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