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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of Economic Inequality >Compensation systems and earnings inequality
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Compensation systems and earnings inequality

机译：薪酬制度与收入不平等

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摘要

We develop a wage-structure determination model in which a firm with incomplete information offers an optimal sequence of contracts for its heterogeneous employees. The model integrating the principal-agent framework and monitoring mechanism is characterized by endogeneity of the selection of two compensation methods: performance-pay and non-performance-pay schemes. The model is used to examine the switching of pay schemes and its inequality effect. We point out that the growth of performance-pay jobs is accompanied by a downward adjustment of the rewards for performance, which brings forth a countervailing effect on wage inequality. The simulation analysis of a case of uniform-distributed ability reveals that the net effect of the growth of performance-pay jobs on wage inequality depends on the driving force behind the switch.
机译：我们开发了一种工资结构确定模型，其中信息不完整的公司为其异类雇员提供了最佳的合同顺序。结合了委托-代理框架和监督机制的模型的特点是内生性地选择了两种薪酬方法：绩效薪酬计划和非绩效薪酬计划。该模型用于检验薪酬方案的转换及其不平等效应。我们指出，绩效工资工作的增长伴随着绩效报酬的向下调整，这对工资不平等产生了抵消作用。对一个均匀分配能力案例的仿真分析表明，绩效工资工作的增长对工资不平等的净影响取决于转换背后的驱动力。

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