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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination >Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition
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Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition

机译：流动性冲击和银行间市场失败：存款航班的作用，不良贷款和竞争

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摘要

Banks may be reluctant to remove bad loans from their portfolios during liquidity shortfalls, giving rise to a moral hazard problem. In this paper, we analyze how liquidity shortages affect the ability of the interbank market to provide liquidity in a moral hazard setting. We distinguish two types of liquidity shocks that arise due to a deposit flight (a contraction in the deposit supply) or to a cash-flow shock (an increase in the non-performing loans). We show that the source of a liquidity shortfall is the main determinant of the decision of banks to stop lending in the interbank market, rather than the extra amount of funds that banks need to cover. An increase in the non-performing loans has more adverse effects on balance sheets than a deposit flight. We also demonstrate that competition has a dual effect on financial stability. Interbank competition enhances financial stability by reducing the liquidity provision cost, whereas credit market competition worsens financial stability by inducing banks to take riskier profiles.
机译：在流动性缺失期间，银行可能不愿意从他们的投资组合中删除糟糕的贷款，从而产生道德危害问题。在本文中，我们分析流动性短缺如何影响银行间市场在道德风险环境中提供流动性的能力。我们区分了由于存款飞行（存款供应收缩）或现金流休克（不良贷款的增加）而产生的两种类型的流动性冲击。我们表明流动性缺点的来源是银行在银行间市场中停止贷款决定的主要决定因素，而不是银行需要覆盖的额外资金。不良贷款的增加对资金床单的不利影响而不是存款飞行。我们还表明，竞争对金融稳定性有双重影响。银行间竞争通过降低流动性规定成本来提高金融稳定，而信用市场竞争通过诱导银行承担风险概况来恶化金融稳定。

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