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Information Design: A Unified Perspective

机译:信息设计:统一视角

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Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.
机译:对于具有不确定收益的游戏,信息设计将分析仅提供信息会在多大程度上影响玩家的行为。信息设计有一个字面的解释,在这种解释下,有一个真正的信息设计者可以致力于为一组游戏参与者选择最佳的信息结构(从她的角度来看)。我们强调一种隐喻性的解释,在这种解释下,分析师使用信息设计问题来表征许多不同信息结构下的游戏玩法。我们将介绍快速发展的信息设计文献中的基本问题和见解。我们展示了信息设计的字面和隐喻解释如何统一大量现有工作,包括游戏中的交流(Myerson 1991),贝叶斯说服力(Kamenica和Gentzkow 2011),以及我们最近对稳健预测所做的一些工作。信息不完整的游戏。

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