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No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors

机译:异类先验的无交易和是交易定理

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We show that contrary to currently widely-held misperceptions, the classical no trade theorem obtains even under heterogeneous priors. That is, when priors are not common, speculative trade is still impossible under common knowledge of rationality. However, trade becomes mutually acceptable if at least one party to the trade puts at least some slight probability on the other party being irrational. We also derive bounds on disagreements in the case of heterogeneous priors and common p-beliefs. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:我们证明,与当前普遍存在的误解相反,即使在异构先验条件下,经典的无贸易定理也能获得。也就是说,在先验条件不普遍的情况下,根据理性的常识,投机交易仍然是不可能的。但是,如果交易的至少一方使另一方具有非理性的至少最小可能性,则贸易变得可以相互接受。在异质先验和通用p信念的情况下,我们还得出了分歧的界限。 (C)2019 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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